Statutory Waiver of Municipal Immunity upon Purchase of Liability Insurance in North Carolina and the Municipal Liability Crisis by Harper, Patti Owen
Campbell Law Review
Volume 4
Issue 1 Fall 1981 Article 2
February 2012
Statutory Waiver of Municipal Immunity upon
Purchase of Liability Insurance in North Carolina
and the Municipal Liability Crisis
Patti Owen Harper
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Campbell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.
Recommended Citation
Patti Owen Harper, Statutory Waiver of Municipal Immunity upon Purchase of Liability Insurance in North Carolina and the Municipal
Liability Crisis, 4 Campbell L. Rev. 41 (1981).
STATUTORY WAIVER OF MUNICIPAL
IMMUNITY UPON PURCHASE OF
LIABILITY INSURANCE IN NORTH
CAROLINA AND THE MUNICIPAL
LIABILITY CRISIS
PArrI OWEN HARPER*
I. INTRODUCTION .................................... 42
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY... 44
A. Roman and English Law ..................... 44
B. Early American and North Carolina Law ...... 46
1. North Carolina's Initial Rejection of
Sovereign Immunity ...................... 46
2. North Carolina's Adoption of the
Governmental/Proprietary Functions
D istinction .............................. 47
C. Attempts to Defeat Defense of Municipal
Im m unity ................................... 49
1. Argument for Judicial Abolition of the
D octrine ................................ 49
2. Argument that N.C.R.C.P. 65 Abrogates the
Doctrine ............................. 50
3. Argument that Municipality's Purchase of
Liability Insurance Constitutes Waiver of
the D octrine ............ ................. 52
III. STATUTORY WAIVER OF MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY UPON
PURCHASE OF LIABnIITY INSURANCE IN NORTH CAROLINA 54
A. Cities and Towns ............................ 54
1. Cases Interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160-
191.1 (Recodified in 1971 as § 160A-485) 56
2. Cases Interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-
485 (As Amended in 1975) ................ 61
B . Counties ................... ................ 63
B.A., University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill; J.D., Campbell University
School of Law. Partner, Harper and Harper, Durham, North Carolina. This arti-
cle is dedicated to Lester W. Owen who first suggested that the topic be addressed
and who has set an awesome example for the author to follow.
1
Harper: Statutory Waiver of Municipal Immunity upon Purchase of Liability
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1981
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
1. Cases Interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153-
9(44) ........ 64
2. Cases Interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-
4 35 . . . . . .. . .. .. .. . .. . .. .. ... .. .. .. . .. .. . 6 8
C. M iscellaneous ............................... 69
IV. EMERGENCE OF THE MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CRISIS, AND
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE CRISIS ................. 71
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ............................ 73
B. Monroe, Monell and Owen-A Liability Trilogy 74
C. W hat Lies Ahead ........................... 76
1. Legislation Limiting Amount of Recovery
Allowed in Actions Against Municipalities 77
2. Risk Management Programs .............. 79
V . CONCLUSION ..................................... 81
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent episode in the continuing academic perils of Pepper-
mint Patti finds her delivering a report on "Hans Brinker and the
Silver Skates."' After describing the boy's noble act which saved
his city from flood, Peppermint Patti raises some twentieth cen-
tury questions that in all probability never occurred to either the
hero or the originators of the folk tale centuries ago in Holland.'
"What if the boy lost the use of his finger? Could the doctor have
been sued for improper diagnosis? And what if the boy's family
brought a personal injury action against the city for failing to
properly maintain the dike?"' Her queries are cut short by an ap-
parently uninterested and unimpressed teacher, who rates the re-
port as "another D minus," and Patti ends her piercing probe of
the Brinker case with a sigh.4
This cartoon is unfortunately an all too accurate reflection of
the increasingly litigious nature of American society today. People
seem less interested in making peace with their fellows than in
1. "Peanuts" by Charles Schultz, 0 1981 United Feature Syndicate, Inc., as
appearing in the Sunday morning comics on April 5, 1981.
2. Actually, Peppermint Patti had her Dutch fairy tales confused. "Hans
Brinker and the Silver Skates" was a nineteenth century story written by Mary
Mapes Dodge. The story about the little boy and the dike is evidently a product
of legend and folklore, and it is not accredited to any particular author. See
Childcraft, Vol. 14 at 178, Chicago Field Enterprises Education Corporation (1966
ed.). No wonder Peppermint made a D minus on her report!
3. "Peanuts", supra note 1, at block 6.
4. "Peanuts", supra note 1, at block 7-8.
[Vol. 4:41
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making their fellows pay. The shootout has merely moved from the
corral to the courtroom as our legal system groans from the weight
of thousands of actions filed per year.' "Sue the bums" is fast be-
coming the battlecry of the land; for every wrong, real or imagined,
there seem to be two dozen lawsuits. Depite her D minus, Pepper-
mint Patti was on the right (or at least the most modern) track.
Yet true rights and fair remedies are oftentimes elusive and inade-
quate. Both plaintiffs and defendants may be left battered,
bruised, a lot older and not much richer at the eventual resolution
of their dispute. Nonetheless, the beat goes on-and municipalities
are finding themselves involved in more and more lawsuits as vari-
ous cases and statutes make actions against governmental units an
increasingly viable route to pursue in plaintiffs' search for relief.
Peppermint Patti's first question opens Pandora's box of med-
ical malpractice actions, a topic whose treatment is left to other
authors and other articles. This article will focus on the problem
illustrated by her second question concerning a suit against the
city-or what has been termed "the liability crisis" in local gov-
ernment. More particularly, this article examines the doctrine of
municipal sovereign immunity in North Carolina, the statutory
waiver of that immunity upon purchase of liability insurance, the
emergence of the municipal liability crisis and the existence of at
least partial solutions to the crisis through a proposed statute and
competent risk management.7
5. In 1978, there were 4,731 cases filed on the U.S. Supreme Court docket.
That same year, 18,918 cases were commenced in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The
U.S. District Courts saw a staggering 138,800 civil cases and 46,100 criminal cases
commenced in 1978. These figures were reported in the Statistical Abstract of the
United States, U.S. Department of Commerce and Bureau of the Census, 191-2
(100th ed. 1979).
6. The National District Attorneys Association, The National Association of
Counties and The National Association of County Civil Attorneys held confer-
ences in 1979 and 1980 entitled, "The Liability Crisis in County Government."
The National Association of County Civil Attorneys also established a clearing-
house of resource materials for attorneys defending actions against county govern-
ments. For further information, write to the National County Liability Informa-
tion Center in care of NACo, 1735 New York Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C.
20006.
7. This paper does not deal with suits brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680 (1976),
nor does it address actions pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1974), the N.C.
Tort Claims Act passed in 1951. Moreover, it should also be noted that this paper
focuses primarily on the immunity, liability and risk management problems of
municipalities themselves (local governmental units), and not on various immuni-
1981]
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY
A. Roman and English Law
Sovereign (or governmental) immunity is an ancient legal doc-
trine that may have originated in Roman law.' One commentator
cites the Roman-Byzantine holding, "princeps legibus solutus est"
as the equivalent if not the origin of the doctrine.9 Black's Law
Dictionary translates the phrase as follows: "the emperor is re-
leased from the laws; is not bound by the laws." 1 Such a rule may
have been related to the Scriptural association of earthly kings
with the heavenly Father." Numerous Biblical verses reflect an at-
titude toward government recognized in medieval England as the
divine right of kings.s As a corollary to the concept of the divine
right, the belief developed that the king could do no wrong, and
certainly a king who could do no wrong had no business being
hauled into his own courts to answer to subjects over whom his
ties which protect certain classes of public officials. For example, judges, legisla-
tors and prosecutors historically have enjoyed extensive freedom from liability for
tortious acts performed in the course of their official functions. See W. PRossER,
LAW OF ToRTs § 131 at 987 (4th ed. 1971).
8. Id. § 131 at 970.
9. Parker, The King Does No Wrong-Liability for Misadministration, 5
VAND. L. REv. 167 (1951).
10. BLACK'S LAW DIcrlONARY, 1355 (4th ed. 1968).
11. In the Old Testament when the Israelites asked for a king, the Lord di-
rected the judge Samuel to annoint Saul "to be prince over my people Israel."
The king came to be called "the Lord's annointed" or "the annointed one," and
the title was also applied to the ideal future king (Hebrew "Messiah" and Greek
"Christos"). I Samuel 8:5, 9:16 (The New Oxford Annotated Bible, Revised Stan-
dard Version 1973). In the New Testament, the apostle Paul wrote the Christians
in Rome between A.D. 54 and 58 and instructed them as follows: "Let every per-
son be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from
God, and those that exist have been instituted by God." Romans 13:1-2. Just a
few years later, Peter's first letter was written from Rome to encourage Christians
suffering in northern Asia Minor: Biblical scholars speculate that I Peter may
have been written after the outbreak of Nero's persecution in A.D. 64. Against
that background of persecution, Peter wrote these words: "Be subject for the
Lord's sake to every human institution, whether it be to the emperor as supreme,
or to governors as sent by him . . .Fear God. Honor the emperor." I Peter 3:13-
14, 17.
12. Shakespeare's Richard II expressed the notion most eloquently when he
asserted that "not all the water in the rough rude sea can wash the balm off an
annointed king; the breath of wordly men cannot depose the deputy elected by
the Lord." TslE COMPLETE WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE, 660, Richard II Act III, Sc. 1,
1. 54-7 (Craig and Bevington ed. 1973).
[Vol. 4:41
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rule was supreme. According to a judgment of the King's court
made in 1234, "our Lord the King can not be summoned or receive
a command from any one." s Blackstone wrote in 1765 that "the
King can do no wrong. . . .The King, moreover, is not only inca-
pable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong; he can never
mean to do an improper thing; in him is no folly or weakness.'"4
Thus the interaction of these ideas gradually gave rise to the devel-
opment of sovereign immunity in England. Yet Dean Prosser ex-
plains that it was not until the sixteenth century, "in the days of
quite absolute monarchs," that the doctrine became firmly estab-
lished as law.' 5
In 1788 the immunity of the sovereign was applied for the first
time to an English municipality in the case of Russell v. Men of
Devon," which held that an unincorporated town could not be lia-
ble for damages caused by a defective bridge (Hans Brinker and
Peppermint Patti, take notice). Prosser offers several explanations
for the Russell result. First, he points out that at the time of the
decision, the concept of the municipal corporation was in a nebu-
lous state; thus, the lawsuit was actually against the population of
the entire county.'7 "In addition to the lack of precedent and the
fear of an infinity of actions, the decision was based on the fact
that there were no corporate funds out of which satisfaction could
be obtained.'" He then enumerates a number of explanations for
the doctrine of municipal immunity that developed in later cases:
1) the municipality derives no profit from the governmental func-
tions exercised solely for the public benefit; 2) in performing gov-
ernmental duties, public officers are agents of the state rather than
the corporation, making the doctrine of respondeat superior inap-
plicable; 3) cities cannot carry on as governments if tax money is
used to compensate persons injured by the tortious acts of city em-
ployees; and 4) it is unreasonable to hold a municipal corporation
liable for negligently performing a duty imposed upon it by the
legislature.1"
13. 3 DAVIS, ADMINismTATwE LAW TREATISE § 25.01, at 436 (1958), quoting 1
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 516 (2d ed. 1923).
14. Id. quoting BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (10th ed. 1887).
15. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 970-1.
16. 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. R. 359 (1788).
17. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 978.
18. Id.
19. Id.
1981]
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B. Early American and North Carolina Law
1. North Carolina's Initial Rejection of Sovereign
Immunity.
Despite the American colonists' contempt for King George III
that propelled them into the Revolution, and the subsequent re-
placement of monarchial rule with a democratic form of govern-
ment, the doctrine of sovereign immunity found its way into the
early annals of our law. Yet as noted by Justice Moore in a 1971
decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court,"° the doctrine was
not a part of the English common law adopted by the State in
North Carolina General Statute § 4-1,s 1 inasmuch as that statute
only adopted the common law of England as of the date of the
Declaration of Independence (1776). (N.C. General Statutes here-
inafter referred to as G.S.). The Declaration was signed twelve
years before the Russell opinion discussed above, and thus munici-
pal sovereign immunity did not become a rule of English common
law until some time after North Carolina declared the common law
to be in force. While the United States Supreme Court decreed in
1821 that no suit could be brought against the United States with-
out its consent, 2 two North Carolina cases decided afterwards re-
jected the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Meares v. Commissioners of the Town of Wilmington,U de-
cided in 1845, involved damages allegedly suffered when plaintiff's
brick wall caved in after the town graded a street. The town ar-
gued that no action would lie against a municipal or public corpo-
ration because it was merely exercising its power as vested by the
sovereign authority for the public's benefit and convenience. The
town's argument was based on the distinction between acts done
by private corporations such as railroads and canal companies for
20. Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589 at 592, 184 S.E.2d 239 at 241
(1971).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (Repl. 1969) reads as follows:
Common law declared to be in force.-ADI such parts of the common law
as were heretofore in force and use within this State, or so much of the"
common law as is not destructive of, or repugnant to, or inconsistent
with, the freedom and independence of this State and the form of gov-
ernment therein established, and which has not been otherwise provided
for in whole or in part, not abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete, are
hereby to be in full force within this State.
22. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821). See also Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 22 U.S. 738 (1924).
23. 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 73 (1848).
[Vol. 4:41
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their own pecuniary benefit, as opposed to acts done by the town
for the benefit of the general public. The Court said that while this
distinction "appears at the first suggestion to be plausible, [it] will
not bear examination, and is more fanciful than real."' 4 Reasoning
that the town's power to do the grading was conditioned upon the
work being done in a proper manner, the Court concluded:
A corporation, whether private or municipal, whether the act is
done with a view to the receipt of money directly or only for indi-
rect or collateral advantages, and whether the land belongs to the
corporation or is only to be used and kept up as streets, in any
and all these cases is liable for any damage resulting from a want
of ordinary skill and caution in doing the work; although it is not
liable when the work is properly done and in strict pursuance of
the power vested in it, for any damage which necessarily results
from the work, and does not depend upon the manner in which it
is done.'
Street improvements in Wilmington were again the subject of
litigation in 1885 when plaintiffs complained that five years after
the city graded its streets, heavy rains flooded their grain mill be-
cause the street gutters were inadequate to carry off the water. In
Wright v. City of Wilmington,' the Court reiterated its ruling in
Meares, stating that "the test of corporate liability in such cases is
the manner in which the work is done, and it is not incurred when
the work is done with ordinary skill and caution.' 7 The Court held
that the city could only be expected to maintain street gutters
which would drain the surface water that could reasonably be ex-
pected to fall-"the corporation is not required to provide against
such extraordinary and excessive rains as could not be reasonably
foreseen and provided against."'
2. North Carolina's Adoption of the Governmental/Proprie-
tary Functions Distinction
Four years after the Wright case, the North Carolina Supreme
Court decided Moffit v. City of Asheville,"2 and adopted the dis-
tinction between acts done for the public good and those done
24. Id. at 80.
25. Id. at 86.
26. 92 N.C. 156 (1885).
27. Id. at 160.
28. Id. at 161.
29. 103 N.C. 191 (237), 9 S.E. 695 (1889).
1981]
7
Harper: Statutory Waiver of Municipal Immunity upon Purchase of Liability
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1981
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
merely for the benefit of the corporation, a distinction it had ex-
pressly rejected in Meares as "fanciful." In Moffitt, a prisoner sued
the city for physical illness he claimed to have suffered because of
a lack of heat and blankets in his cell on a cold January night.
Initially, the Court described the dual nature of a municipality: a
town exercises governmental duties in its capacity as an "Impe-
rium in imperio" (government within a government), and its acts
as a private corporation when exercising certain powers and privi-
leges for its own benefit.30 Based on this duality, the court articu-
lated two rules whereby municipalites would enjoy sovereign im-
munity from suit for torts occurring in the performance of
"governmental" functions, but would be subject to legal actions
rising out of the tortious performance of "proprietary" functions.
The first rule it expressed as follows:
[W]here a city or town [exercises] the judicial, discretionary or
legislative authority, conferred by its charter, or is discharging a
duty, imposed solely for the benefit of the public, it incurs no
liability for the negligence of its officers, though acting under
color of office, unless some statute (expressly or by necessary im-
plication) subjects the corporation to pecuniary responsibility for
such negligence.'
The second rule was stated in the following terms:
When such municipal corporations are acting (within the purview
of their authority) in their ministerial or corporate character in
the management of property for their own benefit, or in the exer-
cise of powers, assumed voluntarily for their own advantage, they
are impliedly liable for damage caused by the negligence of of-
ficers or agents, subject to their control, although they may be
engaged in some work that will enure to the general benefit of the
municipality."3
Thus, the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted a distinction
first enunciated by a New York court in 1842."3 According to Dean
Prosser, this distinction was eventually followed by every Ameri-
can jurisdiction except South Carolina and Florida."
From Moffitt to the present time, North Carolina courts have
continued to extend sovereign immunity to governmental functions
30. Id. at 254, 9 S.E. at 697.
31. Id. at 255, 9 S.E. at 697.
32. Id. at 254, 9 S.E. at 697.
33. Bailey v. City of New York, 3 Hill N.Y. 531 (1842).
34. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 979.
[Vol. 4:41
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and to deny it to proprietary functions.35 Examples of governmen-
tal functions include the granting of a public utility franchise,"6 the
maintenance and operation of a fire department,37 the enactment
and enforcement of zoning regulations," the collection, removal
and disposition of garbage, 8 the construction and maintenance of
public streets and bridges,'4 0 the operation of a public street light-
ing system'" the construction of a sewage system,"' and the opera-
tion of a public library.' 8 Examples of proprietary functions in-
clude the operation of a waterworks system for sale of water for
private consumption," the operation of an airport," and the oper-
ation of an arena for the holding of exhibitions and athletic
events."
C. Attempts to Defeat the Defense of Municipal Immunity
1. Argument for Judicial Abolition of the Doctrine.
While the recognition of municipal sovereign immunity for
governmental functions and the denial of such immunity for pro-
prietary functions remains a viable tenet of North Carolina law,
plaintiffs have occasionally urged the North Carolina courts to
abolish the doctrine. The Courts steadfastly refuse on the ground
that any modification or repeal of sovereign immunity should come
from the General Assembly and not the judiciary. For example, in
Steelman v. City of New Bern,'7 a young boy was electrocuted
upon touching a guy wire maintained by the city as a part of its
street lighting system. His estate sued the city, lost on summary
judgment and conceded in its appellate brief that prior North Car-
olina cases had held street lighting to be a governmental function
35. See generally 9 N.C. STRONG'S INDEX 3d, Municipal Corporations § 5
(1977).
36. Denning v. Goldsboro Gas Co., 246 N.C. 541, 98 S.E.2d 910 (1957).
37. Valevais v. City of New Bern, 10 N.C. App. 215, 178 S.E.2d 109 (1970).
38. Orange Co. v. Heath, 282 N.C. 292, 192 S.E.2d 308 (1972).
39. Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 186 S.E.2d 897 (1972).
40. Robertson v. City of Kinston, 261 N.C. 135, 134 S.E.2d 193 (1964).
41. Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 184 S.E.2d 239 (1971).
42. McCombs v. City of Asheboro, 6 N.C. App. 234, 170 S.E.2d 169 (1969).
43. Seibold v. City of Kinston, 268 N.C. 615, 151 S.E.2d 654 (1966).
44. Bowling v. City Oxford, 267 N.C. 552, 148 S.E.2d 624 (1966).
45. Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority, 288 N.C.
98, 215 S.E.2d 552 (1975).
46. Aaser v. City of Charlotte, 265 N.C. 494, 144 S.E.2d 610 (1965).
47. 279 N.C. 589 at 592, 184 S.E.2d 239 at 241 (1971).
19811
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and thus, municipalities were immune from liability for negligence
associated therewith. However, plaintiff asked the North Carolina
Supreme Court to abolish the immunity, contending that its origin
was questionable, "its application results in gross inequities, and
that the very definite trend in modern decisions is to abolish the
doctrine. ' 4 8 The Court acknowledged that since 1957, sixteen
states had overruled or greatly modified municipal immunization
from tort liability.49 Moreover, the Court indicated that the rea-
sons for the rule may have lost strength over the years; yet it con-
cluded that despite its sympathy for the plaintiff, any change- in
the doctrine should come from the legislature rather than the
courts.60
2. Argument that N.C.R.C.P. 65 Abrogates the Doctrine.
Unable to convince the North Carolina courts to abolish sover-
eign immunity, parties opposing municipalites in certain situations
have argued that the enactment of N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure
65(c) abrogated the doctrine. Rule 65 sets forth the procedure to
be used in obtaining injunctions, and is substantially the same as
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 65. Rule 65(c) requires that appli-
cants for restraining orders or preliminary injunctions give secur-
ity. However, the rule states that "no such security shall be re-
quired of the State of North Carolina or of any county or
municipality thereof, or any officer or agency thereof acting in an
official capacity, but damages may be awarded against such party
in accord with this rule."51
In Town of Hillsborough v. Smith,12 the town obtained a tem-
porary restraining order to prevent defendant's proposed use of
property which the town thought violated its zoning ordinances.
Eventually, the Supreme Court of North Carolina determined that
the town was not entitled to restrain the proposed use; the defen-
dants then asked for damages from the town and its surety on the
$20,000.00 bond the town had posted to obtain issuance of the
temporary restraining order. The North Carolina Court of Appeals
first noted that the enactment and enforcement of zoning regula-
48. Id. at 593, 184 S.E.2d at 242.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 595, 184 S.E.2d at 243.
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A, Rule 65(c) (Repl. 1969).
52. 10 N.C. App. 70, 178 S.E.2d 18 (1970), cert. denied, 277 N.C. 727, 178
S.E.2d 813 (1971).
[Vol. 4:41
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tions is a governmental function, and thus municipal immunity ap-
plies.53 The Court rejected defendants' argument that the posting
of bond as required by Rule 65(c) worked a waiver of the town's
immunity.' The Court repeated the general rule that "a municipal
corporation may not waive or contract away its governmental im-
munity in the absence of legislative authority for such action," and
concluded that the town's act of posting bond "was an unautho-
rized attempt to waive its governmental immunity, and, as such,
was ultra vires. Because the act was ultra vires, it follows that im-
munity was not waived." 6 Curiously, however, the Court con-
cluded that the surety on the bond could be held liable, because
sureties for idiots, infants and corporations (both private and mu-
nicipal) acting ultra vires may be liable, even though the principal
is not liable to either the obligee or to the surety.6
Two years later the North Carolina Supreme Court considered
the argument that Rule 65(c) constituted a waiver of sovereign im-
munity in the case of Orange County v. Heath.5 7 Under facts simi-
lar to those in Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, defendants were
unable to obtain damages from the county. The Court analyzed the
reference in rule 65(c) to damages which may be awarded "against
such party" in light of the language of Rule 65(e), which states
that "an order or judgment dissolving an injunction or restraining
order may include an award of damages against the party procur-
ing the injunction and the sureties . . . ," and stated that "it is
arguable that the provision includes only parties who are required
to give the sureties,""8 (emphasis added-municipalities are not so
required). The Court concluded that the legislature had not abol-
ished governmental immunity in adopting Rule 65. Its rationale for
this conclusion was four-fold: First, the North Carolina Constitu-
tion, Art. IV, sec. 13(2) states in part that "no rule of procedure or
practice shall abridge substantive rights . . ... " Secondly, the
53. 10 N.C. App. at 73, 178 S.E.2d at 20.
54. Id., 178 S.E.2d at 21. (Municipalities are statutorily authorized by N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 160-179 to bring suit to restrain zoning ordinance violations, but the
statute neither authorizes nor requires the municipality to waive its governmental
immunity in the process, nor is that immunity waived by the mere act of institut-
ing a civil action.)
55. Id. at 73-4, 178 S.E.2d at 21.
56. Id. at 74, 178 S.E.2d at 21.
57. 282 N.C. 292, 192 S.E.2d 308 (1972).
58. Id. at 295, 192 S.E.2d at 310.
59. Id.
1981]
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Court relied heavily on comments of Professor Sizemore, a Wake
Forest University School of Law faculty member and a member of
the committee which drafted Rule 65, who compared the rule with
North Carolina procedures for obtaining injunctions prior to the
adoption of the N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure, and concluded that
"the changes in injunction procedure are minute." Said the
Court, "clearly a minute change in a procedural rule would not em-
brace so fundamental a change as to abolish governmental immu-
nity."6 Thirdly, the Court quoted with approval the following
words of the South Carolina Supreme Court:
As we understand the rule relating to the immunities attaching to
sovereignty, such attributes are never to be considered as waived
or surrendered by any inference or implication. The surrender of
an attribute of sovereignty being so much at variance with the
commonly accepted tenets of government, so much at variance
with sound public policy and public welfare, the Courts will never
say that it has been abrogated, abridged, or surrendered, except
in deference to plain, positive legislative declarations to that
effect."
Finally, the Court quoted G.S. § 160-191.1, a statute adopted in
1951 which expressly authorized waiver of sovereign immunity
upon a city or town's purchase of liability insurance, and con-
cluded that "the precise manner in which the Legislature spelled
out the waiver" in this statute was a "clear indication [that] the
General Assembly did not abandon, abrogate, or abolish the rule of
governmental immunity . . . in Procedural Rule 65."" (It is per-
plexing that the Court relied upon a statute that by its terms ap-
plies only to cities and towns in a case involving the County of
Orange; the statute is discussed in more detail below).
3. Argument that Municipality's Purchase of Liability In-
surance Constitutes Waiver of the Doctrine.
Unsuccessful in persuading the courts to abolish sovereign im-
munity, and equally unsuccessful in convincing the courts that
N.C.R.C.P. 65 worked such a waiver, plaintiffs have argued that a
municipality's purchase of liability insurance constituted a waiver
of the doctrine. Such an approach was taken in Stephenson v. City
60. Id. at 296, 192 S.E.2d at 310.
61. Id.
62. Id. 192 S.E.2d at 310-11.
63. Id. at 296-7, 192 S.E.2d at 311.
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of Raleigh," where plaintiff's decedent had died from injuries sus-
tained in a rear-end collision with a city truck used to collect prun-
ings from shrubbery and trees along city streets. Similar to city
garbage collection services, these actions were classified as govern-
mental, and thus the city's performance of such functions was im-
munized from tort liability.65 Nonetheless, the city had purchased
liability insurance covering its motor vehicles, and the truck in-
volved in decedent's accident was listed on a schedule of covered
vehicles attached to the city's liability insurance policy." The pol-
icy included a "Municipality Endorsement" which read as follows:
It is hereby agreed the Companies will not, in case of loss or dam-
age arising under this policy during the term thereof, claim ex-
emption from liability to the named insured because of any stat-
ute, ordinance or other legal restrictions, whereby the named
assured shall, by reason of its being a municipal corporation, be
legally exempt from liability for damage, and that in all cases of
loss or damage, settlement shall be made as herein provided the
same as though the named assured were a private corporation.'7
Based on that provision, plaintiff argued that the city had con-
tractually agreed not to plead its immunity-in other words, the
immunity had been waived by the purchase of liability insurance.
The Court disagreed, and stated that the clause "clearly reveals
that the policy is one of indemnity against loss, and protects only
the insured, the City of Raleigh, and does not purport to create
liability to anyone who may suffer tortious injury as result of acts
of officials, agents or employees of the city in the performance of
governmental duties.""
The Court cited G.S. § 160-1 for the proposition that a munic-
ipal corporation has only those powers "'prescribed by statute,
and those necessarily implied by law, and no other.' "1 Because at
that time no statute existed that empowered a municipality to
waive its tort liability immunity, directly or indirectly, the munici-
pality has no power to do so.7°
64. 232 N.C. 42, 59 S.E.2d 195 (1950).
65. Id. at 46, 59 S.E.2d at 198-9.
66. Id. at 44, 59 S.E.2d at 197.
67. Id. at 45, 59 S.E.2d at 197.
68. Id. at 47, 59 S.E.2d at 199.
69. Id.
70. At that time, a minority of jurisdictions had adopted the rule that a mu-
nicipality's purchase of liability insurance works a waiver of sovereign immunity
from tort liability to the extent of the policy coverage. North Carolina adopted
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III. STATUTORY WAIVER OF MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY UPON PURCHASE
OF LIABILITY INSURANCE IN NORTH CAROLINA
A. Cities or Towns
One year after the Stephenson decision, the North Carolina
General Assembly adopted G.S. § 160-191.1, enacted April 14, 1951
and effective July 1, 1951, which provided as follows:
Municipality empowered to waive governmental immunity-The
governing body of any incorporated city or town, by securing lia-
bility insurance as hereinafter provided, is hereby authorized and
empowered, but not required, to waive its government immunity
from liability for any damage by reason of death, or injury to per-
son or property, proximately caused by the negligent operation of
any motor vehicle by an officer, agent or employee of such city or
town when acting within the scope of his authority or within the
course of his employment. Such immunity is waived only to the
extent of the amount of the insurance so obtained. Such immu-
nity shall be deemed to have been waived in the absence of af-
firmative action by such governing body. (emphasis added). 1
Five important features of the statute are worthy of note.
First, by its terms the statute applies only to incorporated cities or
towns. Secondly it allows, but does not require, such governmental
units to waive their sovereign immunity upon obtaining liability
insurance. Thirdly, the waiver is only effective with regard to torts
arising from the negligent operation of the municipal motor vehi-
the majority rule that absent express statutory waiver, a governmental unit's pro-
curement of liability insurance has no effect upon its immunity from tort liability.
See Annot., 68 A.L.R. 2d 1437 (1959) and 57 Am. Jun. 2d Municipal, School and
State Tort Liability § 57 (1971). See also Valevais v. City of New Bern, 10
N.C.App. 215, 178 S.E.2d 109 (1970) where the court repeated the rule that ab-
sent statutory authority, a municipality has no authority to contract away or
waive governmental immunity for torts committed in the exercise of its govern-
mental functions. See also Roach v. City of Lenoir, 44 N.C. App. 608, 261 S.E.2d
299 (1980) for a similar re-sttement of the general rule.
The endorsement examined in the Stephenson case seems to be of the type
discussed in R. KsEroN, INSURANcE LAW BAsic TEXT § 4.8(d), at 235 (1971)-that
is, an immunity endorsement "added to the policy declaring that the company
will not assert the insured's immunity and will not deny liability because of it."
Keeton continues with the assertion that "[i]t would seem that such an agreement
should be enforced. . . . " At p. 237 he describes the trend toward abolishing tort
immunities as being "soundly supported in public policy," although he acknowl-
edges that the premiums will be much higher if the immunity is unavailable.
71. 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ch. 1015, codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-191.1.
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cles. Fourthly, the waiver is limited to the amount of the insurance
policy itself. Finally, a municipality that fails to take affirmative
action concerning the waiver (i.e., pass an ordinance expressly de-
nying waiver) is deemed to have so waived.
This statute was repealed and re-enacted vertabim in 1971 as
G.S. § 160A-485.' Both the 1951 and 1971 versions of the statute
provided only for waiver of immunity from liability for the negli-
gent operation of motor vehicles. In 1975, the statute was rewritten
in much broader terms and amended to read, as it does at present,
as follows:
§ 160A-485. Waiver of immunity through insurance
purchase.-(a) Any city is authorized to waive its immunity from
civil liability in tort by the act of purchasing liability insurance.
Immunity shall be waived only to the extent that the city is in-
demnified by the insurance contract from tort liability. No formal
action other than the purchase of liability insurance shall be re-
quired to waive tort immunity, and no city shall be deemed to
have waived its tort immunity by any action other than the
purchase of liability insurance.
(b) An insurance contract purchased pursuant to this section
may cover such torts and such officials, employees, and agents of
the city as the governing board may determine. The city may
purchase one or more insurance contracts, each covering different
torts or different officials, employees, or agents of the city. An in-
surer who issues a contract of insurance to a city pursuant to this
section thereby waives any defense based upon the governmental
immunity of the city, and any defense based upon lack of author-
ity for the city to enter into the contract. Each city is authorized
to pay the lawful premiums for insurance purchased pursuant to
this section.
(c) Any plaintiff may maintain a tort claim against a city in-
sured under this section in any court of competent jurisdiction.
As to any such claim, to the extent that the city is insured against
such claim pursuant to this section, governmental immunity shall
be no defense. Except as expressly provided herein, nothing in
this section shall be construed to deprive any defense to any tort
claim lodged against it, or to restrict, limit, or otherwise affect
any defense that the city may have at common law or by virtue of
any statute. Nothing in this section shall relieve a plaintiff from
any duty to give notice of his claim to the city, or to commence
his action within the applicable period of time limited by statute.
No judgment may be entered against a city in excess of its insur-
72. 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ch. 698, codified as N.C. GiN. STAT. § 160A-485.
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ance policy limits on any tort claim for which it would have been
immune but for the purchase of liability insurance pursuant to
this section. No judgment may be entered against a city on any
tort claim for which it would have been immune but for the
purchase of liability insurance pursuant to this section except a
claim arising at a time when the city is insured under an insur-
ance contract purchased and issued pursuant to this section. If, in
the trial of any tort claim against a city for which it would have
been immune but for the purchase of liability insurance pursuant
to this section, a verdict is returned awarding damages to the
plaintiff in excess of the insurance limits, the presiding judge
shall reduce the award to the maximum policy limits before en-
tering judgment.
(d) Except as otherwise provided in this section, tort claims
against a city shall be governed by the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure. No document or exhibit which relates to or al-
leges facts as to the city's insurance against liability shall be read,
exhibited, or mentioned in the presence of the trial jury in the
trial of any claim brought pursuant to this section, nor shall the
plaintiff, his counsel, or anyone testifying in his behalf directly or
indirectly convey to the jury any inference that the city's poten-
tial liability is covered by insurance. No judgment may be entered
against the city unless the plaintiff waives his right to jury trial
on all issues of law or fact relating to insurance coverage. All is-
sues relating to insurance coverage shall be heard and determined
by the judge without resort to a jury. The jury shall be absent
during all motions, arguments, testimony, or announcement of
findings of fact or conclusions of law with respect to insurance
coverage. The city may waive its right to have issues concerning
insurance coverage determined by the judge without a jury, and
may request a jury trial on these issues.
(e) Nothing in this section shall apply to any claim in tort
against a city for which the city is not immune from liability
under the statutes or common law of this State.78
This article will analyze the major cases interpreting both the old
statute (G.S. 160-191.1) and the new statute (G.S. 160A-485).
1. Cases Interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160-191.1 (Recodi-
fled in 1971 as § 160A-485)
Moore v. Town of Plymouth74 involved the town's operation of
73. 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ch. 723, codified as an amendment to N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-485.
74. 249 N.C. 423, 106 S.E.2d 695 (1959).
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a fogging machine mounted on a truck and used to spray a combi-
nation of Diesel oil and the insecticide DDT in an attempt to con-
trol mosquitoes. The white fog was disbursed in such a way as to
completely obscure the truck from the view of motorists approach-
ing from the rear. Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle hit by an-
other vehicle whose driver's vision was obscured by the fog; the
town truck on which the fogging machine was mounted was not
hit. In fact, the truck driver did not even hear the wreck over the
operating noises of the fogging machine. The trial court nonsuited
plaintiff's action but the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed,
holding that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to infer that
the town's negligence was a concurrent cause of the accident. Al-
though the Court did not delve into the ramifications of G.S. §
160-191.1, it did quote the statute, and mentioned Stephenson v.
Raleigh," which held that the mere purchase of liability insurance
for motor vehicles did not constitute a waiver of immunity, was
decided prior to the enactment of this statute."
Clark v. Scheld," decided two years after Moore, concerned
another city fogging machine; ten vehicles were involved in rear-
end collisions that occurred when the insecticide spray obscured
drivers' vision. The Court reviewed the Moore decision and stated,
"[i]nferentially, then, this Court has held that governmental im-
munity applies. . . in the instant case unless waived by the mu-
nicipality under the provision of. . . G.S. 160-191.1 et seq.""8 The
Court concluded that no such statutory waiver of immunity had
occurred in the case at bar because plaintiff failed to prove the
statutory waiver; presumably, plaintiff had produced no evidence
of the city having purchased liability insurance. The Court ex-
plained its conclusion as follows:
We think, in the enactment of the legislation above referred to
permitting the procurement of insurance and waiver of govern-
mental immunity, the General Assembly recognized the immunity
of municipalities from tort liability in the operation of motor ve-
hicles in performance of governmental functions, and intended by
the enactment to provide a limited exception to the general doc-
trine. This limited exception does not apply in this case. There is
no proof that the City of Lenoir had waived immunity."'
75. 232 N.C. 42, 59 S.E.2d 195 (1950).
76. 249 N.C. at 431, 106 S.E.2d at 701.
77. 253 N.C. 732, 117 S.E.2d 838 (1961).
78. Id. at 736, 117 S.E.2d at 842.
79. Id. at 737, 117 S.E.2d at 842.
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The Court's attention was turned temporarily from fogging
machines to municipal libraries in Seibold v. City of Kinston.s°
Plaintiff caught the heel of her shoe in a crack in the library steps,
and sued the city (and county) for injuries sustained in a resulting
fall. The Court had previously determined that the operation of
public libraries was a governmental function, and thus, govern-
mental immunity applied unless statutorily waived. 1 Inasmuch as
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160-191.1 only authorized the city to waive im-
munity from liability arising from the negligent operation of motor
vehicles, not libraries, the city was allowed to plead its immunity
in bar of plaintiff's action.
The following year the Court again faced the problems associ-
ated with those infamous fogging machines, and for once, the
plaintiff prevailed! In White v. Motes8 as in Moore and Clark, in-
secticide from the fogging machine obscured motorists' vision. The
city had purchased automobile liability insurance covering a "gar-
bage truck" identified in the policy by make, year, model and iden-
tification number, all of which matched the truck plaintiff hit from
the rear. The policy was in full force and effect at the time of the
accident. In affirming the lower court's judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, the Court rejected the city's three main arguments. First,
the city contended that it had not waived its immunity, but the
plain language of G.S. § 160-191.1 stated that "such immunity
shall be deemed to have been waived in the absence of affirmative
action by such governing body." The Court said because this law
was in effect at the time the insurance policy was issued, it became
80. 268 N.C. 615, 151 S.E.2d 654 (1966). (Because the city of Kinston and the
County of Lenoir had set up a public library jointly, the Court had occasion to
consider not only N.C. GEN. STAT. 160-191.1 pertaining to city liability, but also
N.C. GEN. STAT. 153-9(44) pertaining to county liability.)
81. Seibold v. Kinston-Lenoir Co. Public Library and Trustees, 264 N.C. 360,
141 S.E.2d 519 (1965)-the same plaintiff had been unsuccessful in her earlier
attempt to hold the library trustees liable for her injuries, since they were per-
forming a protected governmental function.
See also Rich v. City of Goldsboro, 15 N.C. App. 534, 190 S.E.2d 229, cert.
allowed, 281 N.C. 758, 191 S.E.2d 362, rev'd., 282 N.C. 383, 192 S.E.2d 824 (1972),
which considered the 1971 version of the statute (Q 160-191.1, re-codified in 1971
as 160A-485). The Court in that case held that a $1,200.00 donation from the
Kiwanis Club to the city which helped fund the operation of a city park was inci-
dental income totally insufficient to support a conclusion that the city operated
the park as a proprietary or business venture; the statute was held inapplicable to
the maintenance of playground equipment.
82. 270 N.C. 544, 155 S.E.2d 75 (1967).
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a part of the insurance contract.83 The town had taken no affirma-
tive action relative to tort liability other than to purchase insur-
ance; thus, its immunity was waived.
Secondly, the city argued that the policy referred to an indi-
vidual rather than to a municipality. This rather technical point
was based on language in the Insuring Agreement of the policy."
The Court observed that the wording clearly contemplated insur-
ance on entities other than individuals; furthermore, the policy was
issued to the Town of Siler City, a municipal corporation. Obvi-
ously the intent of the parties (the insurer and the town) was that
the municipality be insured against tort liability within the limits
of the policy. The Court quoted an earlier North Carolina case for
the proposition that "[ain insurance policy is only a contract and
the intention of the parties is the controlling guide in its
interpretation." 86
Finally, the town claimed that because the policy described
the insured vehicle as a "garbage truck," it should not be liable for
injuries occurring when the truck was being used for purposes
other than garbage collection. The Court flatly refused to adopt
the town's reasoning on this point, since the vehicle on which the
fogging machine was mounted matched the vehicle described in
the policy as to make, year, model and identification number. Ac-
cording to the Court, if the insurer had intended to escape liability
because of the description or use of a named vehicle, "the excluded
description or use could have and should have been written into
the policy."86
Thus the saga of city fogging machines ended on a happy note
for at least one plaintiff. Lest plaintiffs' bar become too encouraged
and municipal attorneys too dismayed, however, Gallican v. Town
of Chapel Hill8 7 illustrates that a town can take successful affirma-
tive action to preclude the automatic statutory waiver of its immu-
83. Id. at 555, 155 S.E.2d at 82.
84. Id. The Insuring Agreement read as follows:
III. Definition of Insured: (a) With respect to the insurance for bodily
injury liability and for property damage liability the unqualified word
'insured' includes the named insured and, if the named insured is an in-
dividual ....
85. Id. quoting Gaulden v. Pilot Life Insurance Co., 246 N.C. 378, 98 S.E.2d
355 (1957).
86. Id. at 556, 155 S.E.2d at 83.
87. 5 N.C. App. 413, 168 S.E.2d 665 (1969), rev'd., 276 N.C. 172, 171 S.E.2d
427 (1970).
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nity. As noted above, G.S. § 160-191.1 was enacted on April 14,
1951 and became effective on July 1, 1951. On June 25, 1951, the
Board of Aldermen of the Town of Chapel Hill unanimously
passed the following resolution:
WHEREAS, Chapter 1015 of the Session Laws of 1951 provides a
method whereby municipalities may waive their governmental
immunity; and WHEREAS, one provision of said law seems to
require positive action on the part of this Governing Body with
respect to whether or not it desires to waive such governmental
immunity; and WHEREAS, it is the opinion of this Governing
Body that the waiving of such immunity is not to the best inter-
est of this municipality: NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RE-
SOLVED BY THE BOARD OF ALDERMEN OF THE TOWN
OF CHAPEL HILL, N.C. [that the town] does not under any cir-
cumstances or in any respect as suggesged by Chapter 1015 of the
Session Laws of 1951 or in any other manner waive its govern-
mental immunity for damages to property or injury to persons as
a result of its activities."
Fourteen years later, plaintiff was injured in a collision with a
Chapel Hill police car, and sued the.town for damages. The town
had obtained a liability insurance policy on its motor vehicles
sometime prior to 1951, and had renewed it annually. Yet the
Board of Aldermen had never passed another resolution similar to
the one adopted in 1951, although that resolution contained no
time limit, and had never been amended, repealed or rescinded.
The trial court allowed the town to plead its governmental immu-
nity in bar of plaintiff's action, reasoning that the town had not
waived its immunity inasmuch as it took affirmative action to ex-
pressly refute such a waiver via resolution. The North Carolina Su-
preme Court ultimately upheld the trial court's dismissal of the
action. Concluding that the 1951 resolution of the Board of Alder-
men was an affirmative action that preserved the town's immunity,
the Court stated that "[to require a town to adopt a new resolu-
tion each time it renews a liability insurance policy or acquires a
new liability policy would place an unnecessary and useless burden
upon the town and impose a condition not provided for in the stat-
ute [G.S. § 160-191.1] or contemplated by the General
Assembly.""
88. 276 N.C. at 175-6, 171 S.E.2d at 429.
89. Id. at 177, 171 S.E.2d at 430.
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2. Cases Interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-485 As
Amended in 1975
Because the old statute (in both the 1951 and 1971 versions)
pertaining to a city or town's waiver of immunity upon purchase of
liability insurance was limited to policies covering municipal motor
vehicles, the 1975 amendment to G.S. § 160A-485 significantly en-
larged the scope of statutory waiver of governmental immunity.
(The statute as amended is set out in its entirety above). Prior to
analyzing several cases which interpret the statute, it is necessary
to note certain aspects of the amendment itself.
Initially it is important to determine those units of local gov-
ernment to which the amended statute applies. It speaks in terms
of "any city," and the word "city" is defined in G.S. § 160A-1(1) as
"a municipal corporation organized under the laws of this State for
the better government of the people within its jurisdiction and
having the powers, duties, privileges, and immunities conferred by
law on cities, towns, and villages. The term 'city' does not include
counties or municipal corporations organized for a special pur-
pose." 90 The definition also states expressly that the word "city" is
interchangeable with the terms "town" and "village."
Secondly, and of major impact, the language of the old statute
stating that the municipality was "authorized and empowered, but
not required" to waive its governmental immunity 1 has been de-
leted (emphasis added). The new law authorizes any city to waive
its immunity but does not permit the municipality to take affirma-
tive action to refute waiver, as did the Town of Chapel Hill in Gal-
lican. Rather, the new statute states that "[i]mmunity shall be
waived only to the extent that the city is indemnified by the insur-
ance contract from tort liability"' (emphasis added).
A third and striking change in the law is the elimination of the
statute's limited applicability to municipal motor vehicle insurance
alone. Instead, "an insurance contract purchased pursuant to this
section may cover such torts and such officials, employees, and
agents of the city as the governing board may determine." '
Fourthly, and of special import to insurance companies, is the
statute's explicit mandate that: "[a]n insurer who issues a contract
of insurance to a city pursuant to this section thereby waives any
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-1(1) (Repl. 1976).
91. 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ch. 1015, codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-191.1.
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485(a) (Repl. 1976).
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485(b) (Repl. 1976).
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defense based upon the governmental immunity of the city, and
any defense based upon lack of authority for the city to enter into
the contract."" This clear expression of the legislature's intent
that the insurer be prohibited from raising the insured's immunity
as a defense will save the courts from the convoluted reasoning
that was employed in Town of Hillsborough v. Smith" to hold the
town's surety liable on its bond.
A fifth feature of the new statute is that plaintiff's recovery is
expressly limited to the policy amount, as it was under the old law.
The new statute goes a step further, however, and states that in
the event "a verdict is returned awarding damages to the plaintiff
in excess of the insurance limits, the presiding judge shall reduce
the award to the maximum policy limits before entering judg-
ment"" (emphasis added).
Finally, the new statute preserves the rule of old G.S. § 160-
191.5, which prohibited any mention of the municipality's insur-
ance to the jury.'7 The statute also states that "[n]othing in this
section applies to any tort claim against a city for which the city is
not immune from liability under the statutes or common law of
this state,"'98 (emphasis added), presumably a reference to torts
arising in the performance of proprietary functions.
Case law interpreting G.S. § 160-485 since its 1975 amendment
is scant; two recent North Carolina Court of Appeals decisions
mentioned the statute as amended, but neither case constituted a
landmark decision. In Roach v. City of Lenoir," plaintiffs sued for
damages suffered when a city sewer system backed up into their
home. The trial court dismissed the action upon the city's 12(b)(6)
motion, but the Court of Appeals remanded for amplification of
the record. The Court acknowledged that prior North Carolina
cases had held that "[t~he establishment and construction of a
sewer system by a municipality are governmental functions enti-
tling it to immunity from negligence," and therefore the city could
not be liable "for any damage arising out of the governmental ac-
tivity unless it expressly waives its immunity held pursuant to G.S.
94. Id.
95. 10 N.C. App. 70, 178 S.E.2d 18 (1970), cert. denied, 277 N.C. 727, 178
S.E.2d 813 (1971).
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485(c) (Repl. 1976).
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485(d) (Repl. 1976).
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485(e) (Repl. 1976).
99. 44 N.C. App. 608, 261 S.E.2d 299 (1980).
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§ 160A-485."'00 However, the record on appeal was insufficient to
enable the Court to review the trial court's determination, as a
matter of law, that the city had not waived its immunity pursuant
to the statute, and the case was remanded.
In the second case, Yates v. City of Raleigh,10' the city had
supposedly abated a nuisance by removing plaintiff's tools and
equipment from the premises he rented for his concrete con-
tracting business. He sued for wrongful taking, trespass and con-
version and lost on a 12(b)(6) motion in the trial court because the
city had not bought insurance per G.S. § 160A-485 to cover these
types of tortious activities, and thus its immunity had been pre-
served. Commenting on the "deplorable deficiencies of the record,"
the Court decided that a 12(b)(6) dismissal was improper and re-
manded with the admonition that a municipality's right to remove
private property to abate a nuisance does not extend the police
power "so as to allow a municipality to unlawfully take or destroy
private property under the guise of exercising a governmental
function, and thereafter to hide behind the shield of sovereign
immunity."' 02
B. Counties
In 1955, the General Assembly enacted G.S. § 153-9(44), which
provided as follows:
The board of county commissioners of any county, by securing
liability insurance as hereinafter provided, is hereby authorized
and empowered to waive the county's governmental immunity
from liability for damage by reason of death, or injury to person
or property, caused by the negligence or tort of the county or by
the negligence or tort of any official or employee of such county
when acting within the scope of his authority or within the course
of his employment. Such immunity shall be deemed to have been
waived by the act of obtaining such insurance, but such immunity
is waived only to the extent that the county is indemnified by
insurance from such negligence or tort.'0 3
Two features of the statute are noteworthy. First, statutory waiver
of governmental immunity is not limited to the purchase of motor
vehicle insurance, as it was under G.S. § 160-191.1, which dealt
100. Id. at 610, 261 S.E.2d at 300.
101. 46 N.C. App. 221, 264 S.E.2d 798 (1980).
102. Id. at 227, 264 S.E.2d at 801.
103. 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ch. 911, codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-9(44).
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with cities or towns. Secondly, it does not contain an affirmative
action provision to preclude waiver, as did the city statute. In all
other respects, it is quite similar to the city statute.
1. Cases Interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153-9(44).
In Walker v. The County of Randolph,04 the first case to cite
this statute, plaintiff sued for injuries sustained when she fell down
the county courthouse stairs while reading legal notices on a bulle-
tin board that extended nineteen inches over the stairway. Because
the county stipulated to the existence of a liability insurance policy
secured by its commissioners pursuant to G.S. § 153-9(44), and
further stipulated that its governmental immunity from liability
for damages resulting from injury to persons or property caused by
the county's negligence or tort "was thereby and is now waived in
this action,"'' 05 the Court focused its attention on tort principles
and ultimately affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff.
In Seibold v. Kinston,"06 a 1966 case discussed earlier with re-
gard to a city's waiver of immunity, plaintiff also brought suit
against the county, inasmuch as the public library where she fell
was operated jointly by the city and county. The Court quoted the
provisions of G.S. § 153-9(44) concerning a county's statutory
waiver of immunity, and emphasized that the immunity is waived
"only to the extent that the county is indemnified by insurance
from such negligence or tort." 0 At a hearing on defendants' mo-
tion to dismiss, the county had introduced a liability insurance
policy that protected certain county personnel and employees and
covered certain listed premises owned and operated by the county.
The policy did not cover either the library premises or its employ-
ees, and plaintiff admitted the same in her appellate brief.'
Plaintiff claimed, however, that another policy existed which did
cover the library, the premiums for said policy allegedly being paid
jointly by the city and county. Plaintiff further claimed that the
defendants had prevented her from procuring a copy of the second
policy but she intended to "take such means as are necessary to
compel the production of this second policy at the trial of this ac-
104. 251 N.C. 805, 112 S.E.2d 551 (1960).
105. Id. at 806, 112 S.E.2d at 552.
106. 268 N.C. 615, 151 S.E.2d 654 (1966).
107. Id. at 622, 151 S.E.2d at 658.
108. Id. at 623, 151 S.E.2d at 659.
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tion."'' 9 (The case had not yet gone to trial, the judge having
granted defendant municipalities' motions to dismiss). Nonethe-
less, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided that plaintiff had
had her day in court to compel production of the second policy,
and having failed to do so, she had not proved that the county had
any insurance protecting it from liability under the facts of her
case. As a result, the county was allowed to plead its immunity in
bar of plaintiff's cause of action.
Slip-and-fall cases at the courthouse seem to plague North
Carolina counties as much as faulty fogging machines troubled our
cities. In Cook v. County of Burke," 0plaintiff sued for injuries suf-
fered when she slipped on a wet sidewalk in the courthouse square.
Her case, however, was complicated by the presence of "an ac-
cumulation of pigeon droppings which had become slick and slip-
pery due to the rain."' 1 The Court rather quaintly mentioned
that:
[f]or many years pigeons have been flocking to the courthouse
and roosting upon its ledges and under its eaves ... The com-
missioners had been aware of the problem... and had tried va-
rious ways to keep the pigeons off of the building, but had not
succeeded. They had instructed the custodian to keep the build-
ing as clean as possible and the chairman of the board felt that
the custodian did as thorough a job of removing the pigeon drop-
pings as he could." '"
In fact, just before the plaintiff's unfortunate mishap, the custo-
dian was instructed to clean the sidewalk regularly, and he did
so-sometimes more than once a day. But, as the Court noted
rather despairingly, "[t]he pigeons fly in and out all through the
day." '13 Suffice it to say that the Court evidently felt the county
had done all it could do; a judgment nonsuiting plaintiff's action
was affirmed."' 4
Of greater significance with regard to the county statute is the
109. Id.
110. 272 N.C. 94, 157 S.E.2d 611 (1967).
111. Id. at 95, 157 S.E.2d at 612.
112. Id. at 96, 157 S.E.2d at 613.
113. Id.
114. Id. The Court mentioned that since the county had stipulated to hold-
ing liability insurance at the time of plaintiff's fall, the issue of governmental im-
munity did not arise concerning the validity of a judgment of nonsuit, and cited
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-9(44) as its authority.
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case of Wilkie v. Henderson County.116 The widow of a county jail
prisoner brought a wrongful death action in her capacity as admin-
istratrix of her husband's estate, alleging that her husband died
from beatings and a bullet wound inflicted by county jailers. She
claimed that the county owned an insurance policy which indemni-
fied it "for damages resulting from bodily injury and death of per-
sons on county property proximately caused by the negligence or
wrongful act of county officials and county employees while acting
within the scope of their authority within the course of their em-
ployment."'1 The lower court granted the county's motion to
strike all references in the complaint to the county's insurance and
its waiver of immunity; plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina dealt specifically with a portion of G.S. § 153-9(44)
which read as follows: "No part of the pleadings which relates to or
alleges facts as to a defendant's insurance against liability shall be
read or mentioned in the presence of the trial jury in any action
brought pursuant to this subdividion . . . , and concluded that
the complaint's references to insurance were improperly stricken.
Those allegations were necessary to enable the complaint to with-
stand a demurrer grounded on sovereign immunity. Moreover, the
statute afforded sufficient protection from prejudice in preventing
such references to be mentioned to the jury.
In 1973, the General Assembly repealed Chapter 153 of the
General Statutes entitled "Counties and County Commissioners,"
and replaced it with a new Chapter 153A entitled "Counties."'118 As
a result, G.S. § 153-9(44) became G.S. § 153A-435, which reads as
follows:
Liability insurance; damage suits against a county involving gov-
ernmental functions.-(a) A county may contract to insure itself
and any of its officers, agents, or employees against liability for
wrongful death or negligent or intentional damage to person or
property or against absolute liability for damage to person or
property caused by an act or omission of the county or of any of
its officers, agents, or employees when acting within the scope of
their authority and the course of their employment. The board of
commisioners shall determine what liabilities and what officers,
agents, and employees shall be covered by any insurance pur-
chased pursuant to this subsection.
115. 1 N.C. App. 155, 160 S.E.2d 505 (1968).
116. Id. at 156, 160 S.E.2d at 506.
117. Id. at 157, 160 S.E.2d at 507.
118. 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ch. 822.
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Purchase of insurance pursuant to this subsection waives the
county's governmental immunity, to the extent of insurance cov-
erage, for any act or omission occurring in the exercise of a gov-
ernmental function. By entering into an insurance contract with
the county, an insurer waives any defense based upon the govern-
mental immunity of the county.
(b) If a county has waived its governmental immunity pursu-
ant to subsection (a) of this section, any person, or if he dies, his
personal representative, sustaining damages as a result of an act
or omission of the county or any of its officers, agents, or employ-
ees, occurring in the exercise of a governmental function, may sue
the county for recovery of damages. To the extent of the coverage
of insurance purchased, pursuant to subsection (a) of this section,
governmental immunity may not be a defense to the action. Oth-
erwise, however, the county has all defenses available to private
litigants in any action brought pursuant to this section without
restriction, limitation, or other effect, whether the defense arises
from common law or by virtue of a statute.
Despite the purchase of insurance as authorized by subsec-
tion (a) of this section, the liability of a county for acts or omis-
sions occurring in the exercise of governmental functions does not
attach unless the plaintiff waives the right to have all issues of
law or fact relating to insurance in the action determined by a
jury. The judge shall hear and determine these issues without re-
sort to a jury, and the jury shall be absent during any motion,
argument, testimony, or announcement of findings of fact, or con-
clusions of law relating to these issues unless the defendant re-
quests a jury trial on them.
Whereas old § 153-9(44) spoke in terms of liability insurance
for negligence or tort, the new law spells out the fact that counties
may insure themselves from liability resulting from "negligent or
intentional damage to person or property or against absolute lia-
bility for damage to person or property," (emphasis added). Like
the new statute pertaining to cities, this statute authorizes the
county governing boards to determine which liabilities and which
officers, agents and employees shall be covered by the insurance
purchased. And, like the city statute, G.S. § 153A-435(a) specifi-
cally states that "purchase of insurance pursuant to this subsection
waives the county's governmental immunity to the extent of insur-
ance coverage." However, this statute does not order the trial judge
to reduce judgments for plaintiffs in excess of the policy limits to
the maximum amount available under the terms of the policy. Per-
haps trial judges will take it upon themselves to do so, inasmuch as
the statute does expressly limit the waiver of immunity to the ex-
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tent of the insurance coverage.
Of special concern to insurance companies is the statute's ex-
press statement that "[b]y entering into an insurance contract with
the county, an insurer waives any defense based upon the govern-
mental immunity of the county." Similar language appears in the
city statute.
2. Cases Interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-435.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has mentioned this stat-
ute only once. In Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hospital, Inc.,11 the
Court considered a question of first impression in North Carolina:
whether the construction, maintenance and operation of a county
hospital was a governmental or proprietary function. The Court
concluded that such activity was a proprietary function, and hav-
ing so held, it did not need to discuss G.S. § 153A-435, since that
statute concerns only those county functions classified as
governmental.
Three North Carolina Court of Appeals cases have mentioned
this statute, and in each case either the county had not purchased
any liability insurance, thereby preserving its immunity, or the
plaintiff failed to allege a waiver of immunity. In Vaughan v.
County of Durham,so plaintiff was unable to hold either the
county or its department of social services liable for the placement
of a foster child in her home who carried an infectious disease and
allegedly communicated it to plaintiff, necessitating an abortion on
the part of the plaintiff. The Court held that placement of foster
children was a governmental function performed pursuant to con-
stitutional and statutory mandate and for the common good. Fur-
thermore, as a governmental function it triggered governmental
immunity unless such immunity had been waived by the purchase
of liability insurance. Because the county proved it had made no
such purchase, and because the Court of Appeals could not abro-
gate the doctrine of sovereign immunity (being bound by the deci-
sions of the North Carolina Supreme Court, which uniformly left
the abolition of the doctrine to the General Assembly), plaintiff's
action against the county and its department of social services was
properly dismissed.
In Robinson v. Nash Co., 21 a women fell to her death on a
119. 287 N.C. 14, 213 S.E.2d 297 (1975).
120. 34 N.C. App. 416, 240 S.E.2d 456 (1977).
121. 43 N.C. App. 33, 257 S.E.2d 679 (1979).
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stairway in the county register of deeds office. Because the county
had not bought liability insurance pursuant to G.S. § 153A-435,
and because the operation of a register of deeds office was held to
be a governmental function, decedent's estate could not hold the
county liable.
Finally, in Carey v. Wake Co.,1 22 a sixteen year-old girl who
obtained an intrauterine device from a county health department
was prohibited from holding the county liable from complications
allegedly associated with the device, inasmuch as the provision of
public health care was determined to be governmental function,
and plaintiff made no allegation of the county's waiver of its im-
munity via a purchase of insurance.
C. Miscellaneous
It should be noted that North Carolina has two other statutes
involving the waiver of immunity upon purchase of liability insur-
ance. G.S. § 115-53 authorizes any county or city board of educa-
tion to secure liability insurance and thereby waive its governmen-
tal immunity from liability for damage "by reason of death or
injury to person or property caused by the negligence or tort of any
agent or employee of such board of education when acting within
the scope of his authority or within the course of his employ-
ment. 1 23 A similar statute pertaining to the boards of trustees of
community colleges and technical institutes is found in G.S. }
115D-53.1 24
A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court dis-
cussed below (Owen v. City of Independence)12 6 reviewed the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity in great detail. Justice Powell's dissent
contained a survey of the status of the doctrine in various states,
122. 45 N.C. App. 522, 263 S.E.2d 360 (1980).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-53 (Repl. 1978). See the following cases for judi-
cial interpretation of this statute: Turner v. Gastonia City Board of Education,
250 N.C. 456, 109 S.E.2d 211 (1959); Fields v. Durham City Board of Education,
251 N.C. 699, 111 S.E.2d 910 (1960); Huff v. Northampton County Board of Edu-
cation, 259 N.C. 75, 130 S.E.2d 26 (1963); Brown v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education, 267 N.C. 740, 149 S.E.2d 10 (1966); Clary v. Alexander County
Board of Education, 286 N.C. 525, 212 S.E.2d 160 (1975); Presnell v. Pell, 298
N.C. 715, 260 S.E.2d 611 (1979).
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115D-53 (Repl. 1978), (formerly N.C. GEN. STAT. §
115A-17). No cases could be found interpreting or applying this statute. It was
mentioned in Steelman v. City of New Bern, 299 N.C. 589, 184 S.E.2d 239 (1971).
125. 445 U.S. 682, 100 S. Ct. 1393 (1980).
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which indicated that North Carolina is one of four states where
immunity is statutorily waived upon purchase of liability insur-
ance; 26 the other states were Colorado, Missouri and Vermont.12 7
126. 100 S. Ct. at 1431 n. 26.
127. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-104, 24-10-106:
24-10-104. Availability of insurance - effect. (1) Notwithstanding any
provision of law or of this article to the contrary, if a public entity pro-
vides insurance coverage provided by an insurance company authorized
to do business in this state to insure itself against liability for any injury
or to insure any of its employees against his liability for any injury re-
sulting from an act or omission by such employee acting within the scope
of his employment, then such public entity shall be deemed to have
waived the defense of sovereign immunity in any action for damages for
any such injury insured against, subject to the provision of subsection (2)
of this section.
(2) If the defense of sovereign immunity would be available to a
public entity except for the provisions of subsection (1) of this section,
then damages for injury shall not be recoverable in excess of the amount
of the insurance coverage and shall be recovered from the insurer only.
The insurer shall not be named as a party defendant.
24-10-106. Immunity and partial waiver. (1) A public entity shall be
immune from liability in all claims for injury which are actionable in tort
except as provided otherwise in this section. Sovereign immunity,
whether previously available as a defense or not, shall not be asserted by
a public entity as a defense in an action for damages for injuries resulting
from:
(a) The operation of a motor vehicle, owned or leased by such public
entity, by a public employee while in the course of his employment, ex-
cept emergency vehicles operating within the provisions of section 42-4-
106 (2) and (3), C.R.S. 1973;
(b) The operation of any public hospital, penitentiary, reformatory,
or jail by such public entity or a dangerous condition existing therein;
(c) A dangerous condition of any public building;
(d) A dangerous condition which interferes with the movement of
traffic on the traveled portion and shoulders or curbs of any public high-
way, road, street, or sidewalk within the corporate limits of any munici-
pality, or of any highway which is a part of the federal interstate highway
system or the federal primary highway system, or of any paved highway
which is a part of the federal secondary highway system, or of any paved
highway which is a part of the state highway system on that portion of
such highway, road, street, or sidewalk which was designed and intended
for public travel or parking thereon;
(e) A dangerous condition of any public facility, except roads and
highways located in parks or recreation areas, public parking facilities,
and public transportation facilities maintained by such public entity.
Nothing in this paragraph (e) or in paragraph (d) of this subsection (1)
shall be construed to prevent a public entity from asserting the defense
of sovereign immunity to an injury caused by the natural condition of
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IV. EMERGENCE OF THE MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CRISIS, AND
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE CRISIS
At this point, it may be helpful to offer a brief review. We have
traced the development of municipal sovereign immunity in North
any unimproved property, whether or not such property is located in a
park or recreation area or a highway, road, or street right-of-way.
(f) The operation and maintenance of any public water facility, gas
facility, sanitation facility, electrical facility, power facility, or swimming
facility by such public entity or a dangerous condition existing therein.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to constitute a waiver
of sovereign immunity where the injury arises from the act, or failure to
act, of a public employee where the act is the type of act for which the
public employee would be or heretofore has been personally immune
from liability.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 71.185 (Vernon):
71:185. Tort liability for governmental acts, insurance trial
1. Any municipality engaged in the exercise of governmental func-
tions may carry liability insurance and pay the premiums therefor to in-
sure such municipality and their employees against claims or causes of
action for property damage or personal injuries, including death, caused
while in the exercise of the governmental functions, and shall be liable as
in other cases of torts for property damage and personal injuries includ-
ing death suffered by third persons while the municipality is engaged in
the exercise of the governmental functions to the extent of the insurance
so carried.
2. In all suits brought against the municipality for tort damages suf-
fered by anyone while the municipality is engaged in the exercise of gov-
ernmental functions, it shall be unlawful for the amount of insurance so
carried to be shown in evidence, but the court shall be informed thereof
and shall reduce any verdict rendered by a jury for an amount in excess
of such insurance to the amount of the insurance coverage for the claim.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, §§ 1403, 1404:
§ 1043. Waiver of immunity by state, municipal corporations and counties.
When the state or department or board purchases a policy of liabil-
ity insurance under the provisions of section 1401 of this title, and when
a municipal corporation purchases a policy of liability insurance under
section 1092 of Title 24, and when a county purchases a policy of liability
insurance under the provisions of section 131 of Title 24, it waives its
sovereign immunity from liability to the extent of the coverage of the
policy and consents to be sued.-Added 1959, No. 328 (Adj. Sess.), § 14.
§ 1404. Judgments, maximum liability.
Upon trial of any action in which sovereign immunity has been
waived, as provided in section 1403 of this title, a judgment shall not be
rendered against the state of Vermont, a department or board thereof or
a municipal corporation or county for more than the maximum amount
of liability insurance carried by it and applicable to the subject matter of
the action. - Added 1959, No. 328 (Adj. Sess.), § 14.
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Carolina, examined several statutes whereby municipal immunity
is waived upon the purchase of liability insurance, and analyzed a
number of cases interpreting those statutes. One may wonder why
a municipality in North Carolina would ever buy insurance, if the
consequence is a waiver of immunity from suit. There are at least
three answers to that question. First of all, as explained above, mu-
nicipalities have never been protected from liability for the tor-
tious performance of proprietary functions in this State. Insurance
offers protection in those situations where immunity has never ex-
isted. Secondly, municipalities buy insurance to indemnify their
employees, officials and agents who may be subject to legal action
for faulty performance of their official duties. Although public em-
ployees, officials and agents have historically enjoyed immunities
of their own, separate and apart from the immunity afforded the
governmental unit, their immunities are not absolute.2 6 While mu-
nicipalities in North Carolina are not required to indemnify their
employees, officials and agents, many if not all units of local gov-
ernment seek to do so, in order to create a secure working environ-
ment wherein employees do not feel paralyzed in the performance
of their duties for fear of being sued.'2 ' The promotion of good will
between the local government employer and its employees is not
only a virtue but a necessity in our increasingly litigious society.
Thirdly, municipalities may purchase insurance which covers their
performance of governmental functions despite the resulting
waiver of immunity simply in an attempt to protect the public
from harm.
In light of the modern trend to abolish sovereign immunity
altogether, insurance for municipalities is becoming increasingly
important. The birth and growth of the class action, coupled with
the enlarged scope of civil rights actions, may have municipalities
feeling as though the law has come full circle-it seems we have
evolved from the days of "the King can do no wrong" to the belief
that "the King can do no right!"
128. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 987. See also Lawder, Anno-
tation: Governmental Immunities for Governmental Officials, 11 URBAN LAWYER
172 (Winter 1979).
129. See Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 6 (1976) and Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 90 (1976) for
discussions of the validity and constitutionality of statutes authorizing or requir-
ing governmental units to indemnify public officers or employees for liability aris-
ing out of the performance of their public duties.
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A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The biggest contributor to the current crisis in local govern-
ment is undoubtedly that piece of federal legislation known vari-
ously as the "Ku Klux Klan Act" or the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
and now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter referred to as
"Sec. 1983"), which reads as follows:
§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights. Every person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclu-
sively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a stat-
ute of the District of Columbia.180
One commentator describes § 1983 as "by far the most signifi-
cant source of federally imposed personal liability for state and lo-
cal officials, and one of the most heavily litigated sections of the
United States Code."""1 He illustrates the potent effect of § 1983
upon local governments with a real-life example: the elected offi-
cials of a small Kansas town, "[u]pon learning that they could be
held personally liable for violations of the constitutional rights of
individual citizens,. . . sought protection through personal liabil-
ity insurance. When they did, they found that the quoted insur-
ance premium exceeded the total town budget. With true heart-
land aplomb, they voted to disban the town."' In order to
appreciate the breadth of the problem now facing municipalities, it
is necessary to review three landmark decisions of the United
States Supreme Court.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 was amended on Dec. 29, 1979, by Pub.
L. 96-170, § 1, 93 Stat. 1284 to add the words "or the District of Columbia" fol-
lowing "Territory," and to include the statement that for purposes of Sec. 1983,
"Acts of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be con-
sidered to be a statute of the District of Columbia."
131. Jaron, The Threat of Personal Liabilty Under the Federal Civil Rights
Act: Does It Interfere with the Performance of State and Local Government? 13
URBAN LAwYER 1, 2 (Winter 1981).
132. Id. at 1.
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B. Monroe, Monell and Owen-A Liability Trilogy.
In 1961, Monroe v. Pape88 considered the complaint of a
black man whose home had been entered by thirteen Chicago po-
licemen. Plaintiff and his family were pulled from bed, searched
and made to stand naked in one room while the officers searched
the house. The father was taken to a police station and questioned
for sixteen hours before being released; none of the officers had
either a search warrant or an arrest warrant. Plaintiff sued both
the city of Chicago and the individual officers under § 1983. Al-
though the Court held that the complaint did state a cause of ac-
tion against the officers,' the Court held that municipalities were
not liable for damages under § 1983 (emphasis added).1 36
Freedom from liability for municipalities in § 1983 actions was
shortlived, however. Seventeen years later the Monroe holding that
municipalities could not be sued under § 1983 was overruled in
Monell v. Department of Social Services.'" In considering the
claims for back pay of pregnant employees of the New York City
Department of Social Services and Education who were compelled
to take unpaid medical leaves of absence four months before their
expected date of delivery, the Court re-examined the legislative
history of § 1983 and concluded that the 42nd Congress (which
adopted the forerunner of § 1983) did intend for local governmen-
tal units to be treated as "persons" for purposes of § 1983 ac-
tions.1 37 As one author put it:
[Wlith the Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Department of
Social Services, local governments have entered the 'Wonderland'
of Section 1983 litigation. Probably no other recent decision of
the Supreme Court has such vast and disturbing implications for
municipalities. Now that they are 'persons' subject to damages in
a civil suit under Section 1983 for the violation of an individual's
rights, the doors to the municipal coffers are open.'"
Monell did not hold that a municipality could or would be held
automatically liable simply on the theory of respondeat superior.
133. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
134. Id. at 187.
135. Id. at 191.
136. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
137. Id. at 669.
138. Freilich, Rusing and Noland, 1978-79 Annual Review of Local Govern-
ment Law: Undermining Municipal and State Initiative in an Era of Crisis and
Uncertainty, 11 URBAN LAWYER 547, 548 (Fall, 1979).
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Rather, the Court enunciated the following rule for determining
when a municipality incurred § 1983 liability:
A local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury
inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when exe-
cution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as
an entity is responsible under § 1983. "
Monell reserved the question of whether local governments, al-
though not entitled to absolute immunity, should be afforded some
form of official immunity in § 1983 actions.'4 0 That question was
answered negatively two years later in the case of Owen v. City of
Independence.""
In Owen, a former police chief brought suit under § 1983
against the city, city manager and members of the city council,
claiming that he had been discharged from his position as police
chief in violation of substantive and procedural due process. The
city claimed immunity from liability based on the good faith of the
city officials involved. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held
that a municipality enjoys no immunity from liability for constitu-
tional violations under § 1983, and that it may not assert the good
faith of its officers as a defense to such liability.'42 In support of
their holding, the majority noted that by its terms, § 1983 "creates
a species of tort liability that on its face admits of no immuni-
ties.""' The majority then reviewed the legislative history of the
statute in conjunction with the common law in existence at the
time the section was adopted, and concluded that "there is no tra-
dition of immunity for municipal corporations."14 4 Justice Powell
dissented, rejecting this conclusion as incompatible with the 1788
English decision of Russell v. Men of Devon and its American
progeny.145
The majority did acknowledge that there were two common
law doctrines that afforded municipal corporations some measure
of protection from tort liability, the first being the government-
139. 436 U.S. at 694.
140. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
141. 445 U.S. 682, 100 S. Ct. 1393 (1980).
142. Id. 100 S. Ct. at 1398.
143. Id. at 1407, quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
144. Id. at 1409.
145. See generally Id. at 1419-1432 for J. Powell's dissent.
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proprietary distinction as used in North Carolina, and the second
being a somewhat similar doctrine that protected municipalities'
discretionary decisions. The Court decided, however, that
"whatever vestige of the State's sovereign immunity the municipal-
ity possessed" was abolished by the sovereign's enactment of a
statute making it amenable to suit-and § 1983 "was just such a
statute."'u 6
Finally, the majority justified its decision on the basis of "the
principle of equitable loss-spreading" which it explained as follows:
We believe that today's decision, together with prior precedents
in this area, properly allocates these costs among the three princi-
pals in the scenario of the § 1983 cause of action: the victim of the
constitutional deprivation; the officer whose conduct caused the
injury; and the public, as represented by the municipal entity.
The innocent individual who is harmed by an abuse of govern-
mental authority is assured that he will be compensated for his
injury. The offending official, so long as he conducts himself in
good faith, may go about his business secure in the knowledge
that a qualified immunity will protect him from personal liability
for damages that are more appropriately chargeable to the popu-
lace as a whole. And the public will be forced to bear only the
costs of injury inflicted by the "execution of a government's pol-
icy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy (cita-
tions omitted)." 714 7
C. What Lies Ahead
After Monell and Owen, municiplities are justified in wonder-
ing what lies ahead in terms of their tort liability. Certainly local
governments are faced with an increase in their potential liability
which could have drastic fiscal consequences. Whether this in-
crease in potential liability results from a statutory waiver of im-
munity upon purchase of liability insurance, a judicial or legisla-
tive abolition of the doctrine of sovereign immunity or the
expanding sweep of § 1983, municipalities must protect themselves
from risks that could result in financial ruin. Two possible solu-
tions will be discussed briefly below:
146. Id. at 1414.
147. Id. at 1419.
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1. Legislation Limiting Amount of Recovery Allowed in Ac-
tions Against Municipalities.
Under consideration in the 1981 Session of the North Carolina
General Assembly was Senate Bill 220 and its Committee Substi-
tute. 48 Senate Bill 220, entitled "An Act to Require Counties and
148. S.B. 220, 1981 Sess. (March 9, 1981).
A Bill To Be Entitled
An Act To Require Counties and Municipalities To
Contract for Liability Insurance
The General Assembly of North Carolina enacts:
Section 1. G.S. 153A-435(a) is amended by adding a new sentence to
the end to read:
"A county shall contract for liability insurance covering all county
owned or operated motor vehicles providing a coverage limit of no less
than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) for bodily injury to or
death of one person in any one accident and no less than three hundred
thousand dollars ($300,000) for bodily injury to or death of two or more
persons in any one accident."
Sec. 2. G.S. 16OA-485(a) is amended by adding a new sentence im-
mediately after the first sentence to read:
"A city shall contract for liability insurance covering all city owned
or operated motor vehicles providing a coverage limit of no less than one
hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) for bodily injury to or death of one
person in any one accident and no less than three hundred thousand dol-
lars (300,000) for bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any
one accident."
Sec. 3. This act shall become effective October 1, 1981.
S.B. 220, 1981 Sess., Committee Substitute:
March 9, 1981
A Bill to be Entitled
An Act To Waive The Governmental Immunity of Local
Governments in Tort and to Require Them to Respond
in Damages up to One Hundred Thousand Dollars.
The General Assembly of North Carolina enacts:
Section 1. G.S. 160A-485 is repealed.
Section 2. Article 21 of General Statutes Chapter 160A is amended
by adding a new section to read:
"§ 160A-485.1 Governmental immunity waived: liability limited; in-
surance and self-insurance.-(a) The governmental immunity of cities is
hereby waived to the extent of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000)
for wrongful death, bodily injury, or property damage to any one person
proximately caused by any negligent act or omission of any of its officers,
agents, or employees occurring in the exercise of a governmental function
while within the scope of their authority and in the course of their em-
ployment by the city.
(b) Cities shall also be liable for damages for wrongful death, bodily
19811
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Municipalities to Contract for Liability Insurance," would simply
injury, or property damage up to a maximum of one hundred thousand
dollars ($100,000) to any one person proximately caused by any negligent
act or omission of any of its officers, agents, or employees occurring in
the exercise of a proprietary function, in which the city is lawfully en-
gaged, while within the scope of their authority and in the course of their
employment by the city.
(c) Any city is authorized to assume liability beyond one hundred
thousand dollars ($100,000) by the act of purchasing liability insurance.
Liability beyond one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) shall be as-
sumed only to the extent that the city is indemnified by the insurance
contract. No formal action other than the purchase of liability insurance
shall be required to assume liability beyond one hundred thousand dol-
lars ($100,000).
(d) A city must appropriate funds to pay its liabilities under subsec-
tions (a) and (b) of this section. It may elect to purchase insurance, cre-
ate a self-insurance fund, or utilize a combination of insurance and self-
insurance. A city may appropriate funds to provide coverage for its as-
sumed liability under subsection (c) of this section."
Sec. 3. G.S. 160A-209(c) is amended by adding a new subdivision to
read:
"(35) Claims. To provide funds for self-insurance, the payment of
insurance premiums, and claims against the city pursuant to G.S. 160A-
485.1."
Sec. 4. G.S. 153A-435 is repealed.
Sec. 5. Article 23 of General Statutes Chapter 153A is amended by
adding a new section to read:
"§ 153A-435.1 Governmental immunity waived; liability limited; in-
surance and self-insurance.-(a) The governmental immunity of coun-
ties is hereby waived to the extent of one hundred thousand dollars
($100,000) for wrongful death, bodily injury, or property damage to any
one person proximately caused by any negligent act or omission of any of
its officers, agents, or employees occurring in the exercise of a govern-
mental function while within the scope of their authority and in the
course of their employment by the county.
(b) Counties shall also be liable for damages for wrongful death,
bodily injury, or property damage up to a maximum of one hundred
thousand dollars ($100,000) to any one person proximately caused by any
negligent act or omission of any of its officers, agents, or employees oc-
curring in the exercise of a proprietary function, in which the county is
lawfully engaged, while within the scope of their authority and in the
course of their employment by the county.
(c) Any county is authorized to assume liability beyond one hundred
thousand dollars ($100,000) by the act of purchasing liability insurance.
Liability beyond one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) shall be as-
sumed only to the extent that the county is indemnified by the insurance
contract. No formal action other than the purchase of liability insurance
shall be required to assume liability beyond one hundred thousand dol-
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amend G.S. § 153A-435 (the statute whereby a county waives im-
munity upon purchase of liability insurance) and G.S. 160A-485
(corresponding statute dealing with cities) to make the procure-
ment of liability insurance for county and city motor vehicles
mandatory. The Committee Substitute to Senate Bill 220 takes a
broader approach to the problem and would statutorily waive all
governmental immunity of cities and counties to the extent of
$100,000.00. Beyond that amount, municipalities would be author-
ized to assume liability by purchasing liability insurance. In order
to satisfy the base amount of $100,000.00 liability and any amounts
above and beyond that base sum, municipalities would be able "to
elect to purchase insurance, create a self-insurance fund, or utilize
a combination of insurance and self-insurance to pay its liabili-
ties."1 0 (Senate Bill 220 was referred to the Committee on High-
way Safety on May 12, 1981, and did not emerge prior to adjourn-
ment of the 1981 session.)
2. Risk Management Programs.
A second and much more comprehensive solution to the liabil-
ity crisis in local government involves the development of compe-
tent risk management programs for municipalities. The concept of
risk management encompasses more than a sound insurance pro-
gram, although insurance is definitely an important aspect of risk
management. Actually, because of the increased potential for mu-
nicipal liability, many insurers have either raised their rates drasti-
cally or simply ceased to insure units of local government. For ex-
ample, one survey revealed that municipal liability premiums in
lars ($100,000).
(d) A county must appropriate funds to pay its liabilities under sub-
sections (a) and (b) of this section. It may elect to purchase insurance,
create a self-insurance fund, or utilize a combination of insurance and
self-insurance. A county may appropriate funds to provide coverage for
its assumed liability under subsection (c) of this section."
Sec. 6. G.S. 153A-149(c) is amended by adding a new subdivision to
read:
"(38) Claims. To provide funds for self-insurance, the payment of
insurance premiums, and claims against the county pursuant to G.S.
153A-435.1."
Sec. 7. The provisions of this act shall apply only to claims arising
out of negligent acts or omissions that occur on or after the effective date
of this act.
Sec. 8. This act shall become effective January 1, 1982.
149. Id.
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California went up an average of ninety-eight percent from 1974 to
1976.1560 According to Martin J. Jaron, Jr., Assistant to the County
Executive of Fairfax County, Virginia,
[A] number of reasons have been advanced for the insurance in-
dustry's withdrawal from the government market for both govern-
mental and personal liability coverage: the fear of increased liabil-
ity claims and, therefore, high liability risks, making public
insurance unprofitable; uncertain tort liability standards in the
law, making it difficult to predict liability; almost a complete ab-
sence of organized actuarial information upon which to base rates;
manipulation by the insurance industry as a scare tactic, similar
to medical malpractice; and statutory limitations on the amount
of liability insurance that can be written by a carrier.
Like most other institutions, insurance companies do not like
unpredictable situations. Making a profit in the financial risk pro-
tection business depends on the long range certainty of income
exceeding payments by a large enough margin to cover expenses
and turn over a sizeable annual profit. It has been noted that the
public sector is particularly prone to be discarded as a client be-
cause insurance companies do not understand state and local gov-
ernment. Few, if any, insurance firms treat government as a speci-
ality; instead, they have been add-ons to other lines designed for
the private sector. Thus, lack of insurer knowledge about the
state and city operations has probably accelerated the increase in
rates and abandonment of the market. Whether the commercial
companies will re-enter the municipal and state official liability
markets in the next few years with stabilized but higher rates re-
mains to be seen.'"
Jaron indicates that in light of these developments in the in-
surance industry, municipalities are using alternatives such as self-
insurance (the retention of a fund out of which claims can be satis-
fied) to protect themselves. He recommends an increased overall
awareness throughout the local government unit of all potential
risks and the use of risk management as possible means of alleviat-
ing the liability crisis.1 2 He defines risk management as follows:
Risk management is a conscious systematic effort by a public
agency to identify potential exposures to loss and to reduce or
control the possibility that the loss will occur through a number
of identified approaches and techniques, such as training pro-
150. Jaron, supra note 131, at 19 n. 122.
151. Id. at 20.
152. Id. at 22.
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grams designed to improve the performance of public officials."'
Lafayette, Louisiana has applied the concept of risk manage-
ment with apparent success. J. M. Wooderson, special counsel for
that city, and Donald Hoffpauir, the city's risk manager, offer the
following definition of risk management:
Risk management as we know it today is the process of identify-
ing, evaluating, and selecting the appropriate risk treatment de-
vice; implementing the decision; and finally evaluating and con-
tinually reviewing the situation.'"
The North Carolina city of Charlotte and its county of Meck-
lenburg have also developed an extensive risk management pro-
gram administered by an "Insurance and Risk Management Com-
mittee" that involves twenty-five separate governmental entities
with over 17,000 employees. 1"
V. CONCLUSION
In light of recent developments in the law discussed above, lo-
cal governmental units and their legal counsel may feel that the
sovereign crown has crumbled; they may see themselves as kindred
spirits with Richard II as Bolingbroke's takeover of his throne ap-
peared inevitable: "God save the king!" cried Richard. "Will no
man say amen? Am I both priest and clerk? Well then, amen."' "
And, despite Peppermint Patti's D minus, she may yet go on to
law school and one day succeed in obtaining a hefty judgment
against the Dutch city for negligent maintenance of its dike.
Ironically, the word "sovereign" in English law referred not
only to the king; it also represented a gold coin of Great Britain,
"of the value of a pound sterling."'' 8 Presumably, opponents of
153. Id. at 21.
154. Wooderson and Hoffpauir, Risk Management in a Southern City: The
Growth of the Concept in the City of Lafayette, Louisiana, 11 URBAN LAWYER
396, 398 (Summer 1979).
155. Spivey, Risk Management in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 50 Putuc MAN-
AGEMENT, 8 (1978). For an excellent in-depth discussion of the concept of risk
management and the steps involved in implementing an efficient risk manage-
ment program, see Andrew F. Whitman's article entitled Governmental Risk
Management, Mar. 1979, Feb. 1980, which appears in the conference materials
from the NACo conference on "The Liability Crisis in County Government,"
supra note 6.
156. Supra note 12, Richard II, Act IV. Sc. 1, 1. 173-4.
157. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1568 (4th ed. 1968).
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sovereign immunity feel that allowing plaintiffs to sue municipali-
ties freely will give the injured party access to the "deep pocket."
Yet the municipality's pocket is only as deep as those of the tax-
payers. Perhaps the solution to the liability crisis in local govern-
ment lies, in part, in statutes such as the Committee Substitute for
Senate Bill 220,68 and in the implementation of competent risk
management programs that incorporate a combination of self-in-
surance with policies issued by insurance companies. While it may
be inevitable that as the risks increase, so must the rates, it also
seems reasonble to assume that insurers will find a way to help
municipalities protect themselves from risks. As my insurance pro-
fessor has said so often, "if there's an insurable interest, somebody
will write a policy for it."' The hurdle for insurers to overcome, of
course, is that of prohibitively high premiums.
Finally, the answer may lie in part in an increased emphasis
by municipalities on preventing tortious injury, together with an
increased sensitivity to the constitutional rights of persons whose
lives are affected in a myriad of ways by units of local govern-
ments. Coupled with the municipality's efforts to promote safety
and to discourage the violation of individual's rights, this country
could stand a change in attitudes on the part of people whose first
inclination is to "sue the bums." Alternatives to legal action in-
clude out-of-court settlements (an area in which insurers should be
particularly skilled), arbitration and mediation. Various private
groups now offer alternatives to the traditional forum of the court-
room. ' Perhaps through a balancing of the social equities, truly
injured persons will receive just compensation from a more caring,
responsive and accountable government without bankrupting
small-town U.S.A. in the process. Perhaps then the sovereign and
its subjects will enjoy a degree of compatibility that benefits both
158. S.B. 220, 1981 Sess. (March 9, 1981), supra note 148.
159. Professor Lee A. Holley, Campbell University School of Law, Insurance
Law Class, Fall, 1980. At least one commentator, however, feels that the role of
insurance in civil rights litigation should be limited, in order to preserve Sec.
1983's deterrent effect upon unconstitutional behavior. See Lenz, Limiting the
Role of Insurance in Civil Rights Litigation: A Case for Re-Establishing 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as an Enforcement Mechanism," 5 J. oF CoRp. LAw 305 (Winter
1980).
160. See Mediation: A Reader, compiled and edited by Lynn R. Buzzard and
Roy Kraybill and published jointly by Christian Conciliation Service, Christian
Legal Society and Mennonite Conciliation Service, Mennonite Central Commit-
tee, Copyright 1980 by the Christian Legal Society, Post Office Box 2069, Oak
Park, Illinois 60303.
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the government and those governed, and ultimately enhances the
common good.
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